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ENHANCEMENT AND OBFUSCATION THROUGH THE USE OF GRAPHS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – In this study we investigate the use of graphs in corporate sustainability 
reports and attempt to determine, first, whether the use of graphs appears to be associated 
with attempts at impression management, and second, whether differences across three 
levels of reporting regulatory structure (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003) are associated 
with differences in the level of impression management.   
 
Design/methodology/approach - Based on a sample of 120 sustainability reports issued 
by firms from six different countries, we empirically test for differences in presentation 
of favorable as opposed to unfavorable items (enhancement) and for differences in the 
direction of materially distorted graphs (obfuscation). 
 
Findings - For the overall sample we find substantial evidence of both enhancement and 
obfuscation in the graph displays.  We also find more limited evidence that impression 
management differs across companies facing different regulatory structures.   
 
Research limitations/implications – We investigate graph use for only one year’s 
reports and for a sample of large companies from only six different countries.  Further, 
our enhancement findings are not evidence that the companies are necessarily providing 
misleading information. However, our results show that the way information is being 
provided in corporate sustainability reports appears to be manipulated by the firms to 
enhance a positive image and to obfuscate negative trends.  The reports may thus be less 
about increasing corporate accountability across the social and environmental domains 
than about managing impressions.  Hence, it may be beneficial for advocate organizations 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative to provide additional guidance on “how” 
information gets portrayed in sustainability reports. 
 
Originality/value – Our study expands prior research into corporate manipulation of 
graphs to the domain of sustainability reporting and adds further evidence that the 
reporting needs to be carefully assessed. 
 
Keywords – sustainability reporting, graph usage, impression management. 
 
Paper type – Research paper. 
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ENHANCEMENT AND OBFUSCATION THROUGH THE USE OF GRAPHS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
 
Introduction 
 Corporate issuance of stand-alone social responsibility reports, often referred to as 
sustainability reports, has grown dramatically over the past decade.  And while such 
reporting offers opportunities for increased corporate accountability and transparency, it 
also has been criticized as being little more than corporate propagandizing (see, e.g., Aras 
and Crowther, 2009; Hopwood, 2009; Milne and Gray, 2007).  Accordingly, in this study 
we examine whether one tool of information provision – the presentation of graphs – is 
being used in these reports as tools of impression management.  Borrowing from the 
social psychology literature, Merkl-Davies, Brennan, and McLeay (2011) argue 
impression management construction can be accomplished either by emphasizing positive 
organizational outcomes (enhancement) or by obfuscating negative organizational 
performance (obfuscation).  Because this classification appears to fit well with evidence 
on the corporate use of graphs in financial reports as tools of impression management 
(see, e.g., Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1997; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; Courtis, 1997; 
Godfrey, Mather, and Ramsay, 2003; Mather, Ramsay, and Steen, 2000; Muino and 
Trombetta, 2009; Steinbart, 1989), we investigate in this study, whether the strategies 
appear to be used as well in the presentation of graphs in stand-alone sustainability 
reports.1   
 In addition to examining for evidence of enhancement and obfuscation in the use 
of graphs in sustainability reports, we also test for differences in their use across 
                                                
1 Authors in the graph literature typically refer to the choice to graph items with a positive trend as 
selectivity bias, while misrepresentation in underlying trends through incorrectly depicted graphs is called 
distortion bias.  Because our focus is on the potential use of graphs in sustainability reports as tools of 
impression management, we use Merkl-Davies et al.’s (2011) terminology. 
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countries.  Merkl-Davies et al. (2011) also argue that differences in the way managers 
perceive their accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders are expected to be 
related to differences in impression motivation, and thus also the use of impression 
management techniques.  We proxy for differences in managerial perceptions of 
accountability using Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki’s (2003) three levels of reporting 
regulatory structure and examine for differences in the use of graphs in sustainability 
reports as tools of impression management by companies from countries across the three 
levels. 
 Based on a review of stand-alone sustainability reports issued by corporations 
from the United Kingdom and the United States (Cluster 1 companies), France and 
Germany (Cluster 2 companies), and Italy and Spain (Cluster 3 companies), we find first, 
considerable evidence of both enhancement and obfuscation in the use of graphs.  More 
than 70 percent of the graphs included the standalone reports depict items with a 
favorable underlying trend.  Similarly, for those graphs constructed with material 
distortion (based on the relative graph discrepancy index) more than 60 percent are biased 
in a direction that is favorable to the company (overemphasizing positive trends or 
underemphasizing negative ones).  We also find more limited evidence of differences in 
enhancement and obfuscation across reporting regulatory structures.  The difference in 
average number of graphs per company depicting favorable as opposed to unfavorable 
trends is statistically lower for the Cluster 1 firms than for companies from either Cluster 
2 or Cluster 3 countries.  We also find that the percentage of graphs constructed with 
material distortion increases across the three clusters (Cluster 1 companies have the 
lowest percentage of materially distorted graphs in their standalone sustainability reports 
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whereas Cluster 3 firms have the highest percentage).  However, whereas the difference 
in the average number of materially distorted graphs per company with a favorable as 
opposed to an unfavorable bias is lower for Cluster 1 firms relative to the other two 
cluster companies, the mean difference (favorable minus unfavorable) is not statistically 
significant for the comparison between the Cluster 1 and Cluster 3 samples.  Further, 
neither enhancement nor obfuscation strategies differs significantly across the Cluster 2 
and Cluster 3 company graphs. 
 Overall, our results support claims by critics of voluntary sustainability reporting 
that the practice may be more about public relations than about increasing the 
transparency and accountability of corporations with respect to their sustainability 
performance.  As such, our findings suggest that arguments calling for greater regulation 
and guidance in the use of graphs in financial reports (see, e.g., Beattie and Jones, 2008) 
are equally relevant with respect to graph usage in sustainability reporting.   We begin 
with background on our topic. 
Background and Justification for the Study 
 
Impression Management in the Use of Graphs 
 
 Impression management in corporate reporting, according to Merkl-Davies et al. 
(2011, p. 318), “entails managers opportunistically taking advantage of information 
asymmetries” to bias readers’ perceptions of firm performance.  These authors, 
borrowing from the social psychology literature (e.g., Leary and Kowalski, 1990; Leary, 
Tchividjian, and Kraxberger, 1994), differentiate impression management construction 
along two distinct patterns.  They note (p. 318) that impression management can be 
accomplished either by emphasizing positive organizational outcomes (enhancement) or 
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by obfuscating negative organizational performance (obfuscation).  Merkl-Davies et al. 
(2011) further note that enhancement entails the presentation of an accurate, but 
favorable, depiction of corporate activities, whereas obfuscation involves presenting 
images that are not accurate (Leary et al., 1994).  This classification appears to fit well 
with prior evidence on the corporate use of graphs in financial reports as tools of 
impression management (e.g., Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1997; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 
Courtis, 1997; Godfrey, Mather, and Ramsay, 2003; Mather, Ramsay, and Steen, 2000; 
Muino and Trombetta, 2009; Steinbart, 1989). 
 Muino and Trombetta (2009) note that one of the major findings of the financial 
report graph research is that the choice to include graphs in corporate reports and the 
choice of what variables get graphed appear to be associated with positive performance.  
Beattie and Jones (2000a), for example, report a significant positive relation between 
one-year changes in financial performance variables and the changes in the inclusion of 
graphs of those items.  Thus the choice of what to highlight via graphical presentation 
appears to be related to the emphasis of positive performance (enhancement). 
 Prior research into graph use in corporate financial reports also provides evidence 
of attempts at obfuscation.  The ‘obfuscation hypothesis’ suggests managers have an 
incentive to obfuscate failures and underscore successes (Adelberg, 1979).  As explored 
by, for example, Courtis (1995), it suggests a lack of neutrality in how management 
presents information and a preference to communicate in a manner that conceals bad 
news using rhetorical devices.  However, in addition to rhetorical manipulation, Merkl-
Davies and Brennan (2007) argue that manipulation can also be visual and structural, 
which can be illustrated by the use of graphs.  Using graphs to present information and 
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data is powerful because they give a “more direct and immediate” (Beattie and Jones 
2000a, 216) view of the data and are easier to remember (Beattie and Jones, 1992).  As 
noted by Muino and Trombetta (2009), the financial graph literature documents the 
existence of a substantial number of graphs that are materially distorted.  To illustrate, 
Steinbart (1989), Beattie and Jones (1992), and Beattie and Jones (1999) all find that 
approximately  25 percent of the financial item graphs in their respective samples 
exhibited distortion at or above the 10 percent level.2  Perhaps more troubling, prior 
studies also show that where distortion occurs, it is much more likely to portray the 
company favorably (either overstatement of a positive trend or understatement of a 
negative trend) as opposed to unfavorably.  Thus, these findings suggest that managers 
appear to manipulate the presentations in order to obfuscate the underlying performance. 
 The evidence of enhancement and obfuscation strategies regarding the use of 
graphs summarized above suggests that corporations appear to be using graphs in their 
financial reports as tools of impression management.  Our interest, however, lies not in 
the use (and potential misuse) of graphs in financial reports, but instead, with the question 
of whether managers also manipulate the use of graphs in a separate medium of corporate 
disclosure, stand-alone sustainability reports.  
Stand-Alone Sustainability Reporting 
 As noted by Adams and Narayarnan (2007), Ballou, Heitger, and Landes (2006), 
and Erusalimsky, Gray and Spence (2006), among others, corporate sustainability 
reporting has grown dramatically over the past decade.  Indeed, KPMG International 
                                                
2 Steinbart (1989), Beattie and Jones (1992), and Beattie and Jones (1999) all measure distortion using the 
graph discrepancy index developed by Tufte (1983).  Interestingly, Tufte (1983) suggests that GDI 
measures above or below 5% should be classified as materially distorted.  However, because Steinbart 
(1989) only reports GDI scores at 10% or more, we use that same level of distortion from the data 
presented by Beattie and Jones (1992; 1999) for this comparative discussion.  
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reported that by 2008 nearly 80 percent of the Global 250 companies were issuing such 
reports (KPMG International, 2008, p. 13).  Often based on what Elkington (1997) refers 
to as triple bottom line reporting,3 these documents typically provide information on the 
issuing entity’s social and environmental activities in addition to financial performance 
data.   
 The rise in stand-alone sustainability reporting has led to a debate in the academic 
literature over its potential for increasing organizational accountability versus its capture 
as just another tool for corporate public relations.  With respect to the former, Unerman, 
Bebbington, and O’Dwyer (2007, p. 3) argue that “broader techniques of sustainability 
accounting and accountability” can be powerful tools for addressing the impacts of firms’ 
social and environmental actions.  As noted by Dingwerth and Eichinger (2010, p. 74): 
 The use of disclosed information is expected to enable stakeholders to make 
 informed decisions, confront disclosers through shareholder motions or 
 collectively organize against them if deemed necessary.  In short, transparency is 
 expected to become a tool for holding powerful actors accountable. 
 
In contrast, others argue that the reporting may instead be used as a tool for corporate 
legitimization.  Hopwood (2009, p. 437), for example, notes that corporations may use 
the reporting to provide “a new face to the outside world while protecting the inner 
workings of the organization from external view.”  To the extent that such practices 
work, he notes that fewer questions may be asked of the organization, and thus, less is 
really known.  Our concern is that, just as corporations appear to use graphs in financial 
reports as tools of impression management relative to financial performance, they may be 
                                                
3 Milne and Gray (2007) note that, although these reports are often referred to as sustainability reports, it is 
highly questionable whether even the best of the triple bottom line reports really reflect the concept of 
sustainability.  Aras and Crowther (2009), Moneva, Archel, and Correa (2006), and Gray (2010), among 
others, raise identify similar concerns with corporate reporting.  This vein of criticism is beyond the scope 
of our investigation.  
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using graphs in their sustainability reports to project a more favorable image of not only 
their financial performance, but of their social and environmental performance as well.  
As such, exploring the use of graphs in the reports can shed light on whether the 
disclosures are about increased transparency and accountability or more about corporate 
image manipulation. 
 Accordingly, the first intent of our investigation is to examine whether graphs 
used in corporate sustainability reports appear to be used as tools of impression 
management.  More specifically, we attempt to determine the degree to which companies 
appear to be adopting strategies of enhancement (the inclusion of more graphs of items 
with a favorable underlying trend), and obfuscation (the degree to which graphs included 
in the reports suffer from material distortion, and whether, where it exists, this distortion 
portrays a more favorable representation of the underlying data being graphed).   
Differences across Countries 
 In addition to identifying the existence of impression management in the use of 
graphs in corporate sustainability reports, we also examine whether it varies across 
countries.  Merkl-Davies et al. (2011) note that, from the social psychology perspective, 
impression management consists of not only impression construction, but also of 
impression motivation.  Because the act of impression management is “embedded in, and 
dependent on, social relations” the social “presence” of others is an essential part of the 
process (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011, p. 319).  More specifically within the corporate 
reporting context, Merkl-Davies et al. (2011) argue that the accountability relationship 
between management and its stakeholders is expected to influence the level of impression 
motivation and thus the use of impression management.  We posit that where managers 
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perceive greater accountability for their actions, the motivation for impression 
management will be reduced.  We further argue that differences in institutional 
characteristics likely lead to differences in those managerial perceptions, and as such, the 
use of graphs as tools of impression management will likely vary across companies from 
countries with differing institutional characteristics.  
 Several recent studies attempt to differentiate aspects of impression management, 
sustainability reporting, or financial manipulation (a form of impression management) 
across countries grouped on various institutional characteristics.  Beattie and Jones 
(2000), for example, rely on Nobes’ (1983) classification of international accounting 
systems into micro-Anglo Saxon practices and macro-continental accounting practices, 
and attempt to determine whether bias in the use of financial graphs differs across the 
groupings.  Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua (2009) also use a dichotomous country 
classification scheme to test for differences in sustainability report assurance practices.  
However, Simnett et al. classify the countries as either stakeholder-oriented or 
shareholder-oriented based on whether they are a common law or a code law country.4  
 While both Beattie and Jones (2000) and Simnett et al. (2009) use a dichotomous 
country classification scheme, we believe a binary classification does not proxy for 
differences in managerial perceptions of accountability, the factor assumed to influence 
use of impression management methods, as well as Leuz et al.’s (2003) cluster analysis 
based on the reporting regulatory structure of the country.  The latter’s scheme takes into 
consideration the interdependencies between corporate reporting regulation and other 
elements of the institutional infrastructure that are likely designed to fit and reinforce 
                                                
4 Simnett et al. (2009) follow Ball, Kothari, and Robin’s (2000) argument that companies from common 
law countries have a more shareholder-oriented governance model. 
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each other (Leuz, 2010). In particular, Leuz et al. (2003) consider numerous institutional 
factors including legal origin, tradition, and enforcement, the level of investor rights, the 
importance of equity markets, ownership concentration, and the level of disclosure 
requirements. We believe the focus on a broader set of institutional parameters better 
captures the level of perceived accountability in each country.  And while Leuz et al.’s 
(2003) classification scheme is designed relative to financial reporting, we believe the 
differences in perceived accountability would also be expected to influence managerial 
actions with respect to other public disclosure.  We believe this to be particularly true 
where that disclosure is at least partially targeted at market participants, as is argued 
(Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011; 
Guidry and Patten, 2010) for standalone sustainability report issuance. 
 Based on the underlying legal and institutional characteristics of the countries, 
Leuz et al. (2003, p. 507) identify three distinct country clusters.  These are: 
(1) Outsider economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor 
rights, and strong legal enforcement; 
 
(2) insider economies with less-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak 
investor rights, but strong legal enforcement; and  
 
(3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement. 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) provide evidence that earnings management occurs least in their 
sample of firms from Cluster 1 countries and most for Cluster 3 companies.  They note 
(p. 506) that their definition of earnings management is “the alteration of firms’ reported 
economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence 
contractual outcomes.” This is, we argue, another form of impression management, and 
as such, we posit that where managers perceive greater accountability for their actions, 
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the motivation for impression management will be reduced. Thus, weaker regulatory 
reporting structures, as captured by Leuz et al.’s clustering, might also be expected to be 
associated with managerial perceptions of reduced accountability.  Accordingly, we 
expect companies from Cluster 1 countries (Cluster 3 countries) to exhibit the lowest 
(highest) incidence of enhancement and obfuscation in their use of graphs in 
sustainability reports. 
Methods and Results 
Sample 
 Our sample consists of 120 companies representing the 20 largest publicly traded 
firms from six different countries (in terms of market capitalization as of 31.12.2006) for 
which a 2006 stand-alone sustainability report was available for review. The 
sustainability reports were downloaded as PDF files from the corporate websites. Our 
country choices were based on the Leuz et al. (2003) cluster analysis and consist of the 
U.K. and the U.S. (Cluster 1 sample), France and Germany (Cluster 2 sample), and Italy 
and Spain (Cluster 3 sample).5  A list of sample firms is available from the authors. 
 We reviewed each of the 120 sustainability reports and hand-collected data on 
graph usage.  Because our measures of enhancement and obfuscation (discussed below) 
require trend data, we limited our analysis to graphs with multiple year observations (n = 
461 for Cluster 1, 482 for Cluster 2, and 691 for Cluster 3).  Table 1 provides summary 
                                                
5 In non-tabulated tests, we examined for differences in our enhancement and obfuscation measures across 
countries within the clusters.  Only one difference was statistically significant.  U.K. company reports 
contained significantly more materially distorted graphs with a favorable bias than did the reports for the 
U.S. sample firms (significant at p = .078, two-tailed).  However, the average for the U.K. firms was not 
higher than the average for the sample companies from any of the cluster 2 or cluster 3 countries.  Further, 
the means of the difference in materially distorted graphs with favorable versus unfavorable bias (favorable 
minus unfavorable) was not statistically significant.  Thus, the results we report appear to be driven by 
differences across the clusters rather than being due to individual country effects.  
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information on the types of items graphed across both area (social versus environmental 
versus financial) and Cluster.  
---------- Table 1 about here ---------- 
Impression Management - Enhancement 
 The primary intent of our investigation is to determine whether, consistent with 
findings from the research into graph usage in financial reports, companies appear to use 
the graphs as tools of impression management. Our proxy for enhancement is the 
selectivity of items graphed.  As noted by Mather et al. (2000, p. 71), “selectivity is 
concerned with whether the choice to graph a variable is related to . . .  performance,” and 
thus captures the attribute of impression management referred to by Merkl-Davies et al. 
(2011) as enhancement.  Similar to Beattie and Jones (1992), we measure selectivity by 
examining the trend in the underlying data for the last two observations and test whether 
a significantly greater proportion of the items graphed portray an item whose underlying 
trend is in a favorable direction.  It is important to note that changes in a given measure 
over time can be either favorable or unfavorable depending on the nature of the item 
being graphed.  For example, increases in the percentage of management positions held 
by minority classes or the amount of material recycled would be classified as a favorable 
trend, but increases in the amount of greenhouse gas emissions would be considered 
unfavorable.  Similarly, decreases in energy usage would be a favorable trend whereas 
decreases in charitable spending would be classified as unfavorable.  
 As reported in Table 2, there is clear evidence of favorable bias in the choice of 
items graphed across the overall sample (Panel A). Just over 70 percent of the graphs 
included in the sustainability reports (1,152 out of 1634) depict items with a favorable 
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trend.   Assuming an equal likelihood of favorable or unfavorable trends, the binomial 
probability of such a proportion is statistically significant (at p < .001, two-tailed). Thus, 
similar to the use of graphs in financial reports, companies appear to use the depictions to 
enhance the positive attributes of their sustainability performance. 
Panel B of Table 2 identifies the average number of graphs per company with 
favorable trends, the average number with unfavorable (or flat) trends, and the difference 
across favorable and unfavorable trends, on average, broken down by clusters.  As 
highlighted in the table, while companies from all three clusters have, on average, more 
graphs depicting favorable trends than unfavorable trends, the mean difference (favorable 
less unfavorable) is smaller for Cluster 1 companies than for Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 
firms.  Cluster 1 companies, on average, include 3.98 more graphs with favorable trends 
than unfavorable ones, whereas the Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 firms show a difference of 
6.30 and 7.30 graphs per company, respectively.  Based on a t-test of means, the 
differences are statistically significant for Cluster 1 firms versus both Cluster 2 
companies (at p < .10, one-tailed) and Cluster 3 firms (at p < .05, one-tailed).  However, 
the difference in means across Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 companies is not statistically 
significant.  
 Overall, we find considerable evidence of an enhancement strategy in the choice 
of items graphed in the sample company sustainability reports.  Our evidence also 
provides at least some support for our expectation that the degree of enhancement will be 
more prevalent moving from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 companies, although the differences 
are limited to only Cluster 1 firms in comparison to the firms from the other clusters.   
---------- Table 2 about here ---------- 
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Impression Management - Obfuscation 
 The next stage of our analysis focuses on the incidence of obfuscation.  We 
measure the degree of obfuscation by identifying the degree of graph distortion and 
whether, where it exists, the distortion appears also to be used as a tool of impression 
management. The fundamental principle of graph design is that the representation of 
numbers, as physically measured on the surface of the graph itself, should be directly 
proportional to the numerical vales of the variables being presented (Tufte, 1983, p. 56). 
Violations of this principle are defined as measurement distortion. We measure graph 
distortion using the relative graph discrepancy (RGD) index. Mather, Mather and Ramsay 
(2005) developed this metric to overcome severe limitations inherent in the use of the 
graph discrepancy index (GDI) employed in most of the prior studies of graph distortion 
(e.g., Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1997; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; Courtis, 1997).6 Mather 
et al. (2005) define RGD as: 
)(
3
32
g
ggRGD −=  
where g2 is the height of the last column in the graph and g3 is the correct height of the 
last column if plotted accurately, i.e., 
2
1
1
3 *dd
gg = ,  
where  
g1 = height of first column (graph);  
                                                
6 See Mather et al. (2005) for a discussion of the limitations of the GDI measure.   
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d1 = value of first data point (corresponding to the first column);  
d2 = value of last data point (corresponding to last column) 
 Following Mather et al. (2005) and Muino and Trombetta (2009), we choose a 
cut-off point of 2.5 percent as our threshold for classifying graphs as being materially 
distorted.7  In order to determine whether the materially distorted graphs are used as tools 
of impression management, we classify them as “favorable” or “unfavorable” distortions.  
Similar to the classification of selectivity discussed above, favorable distortion occurs 
when the trend of a good item (e.g., increases in the amount of materials recycled) is 
graphically overstated or the trend of a bad item (e.g., increases in toxics released to the 
air) is graphically understated.  When the opposite occurs, the distortion is classified as 
unfavorable.   
 Figure 1 shows an example of how a materially distorted graph can convey an 
inaccurate message about the underlying data.  Panel A depicts the decreasing trend in 
carbon dioxide emissions as it was shown in the sustainability report of one of our sample 
companies.8 When compared to the correspondent undistorted graph (Panel B), it is clear 
that the distortion bias portrays a more favorable view of corporate environmental 
performance by making the decrease in carbon dioxide emissions appear more dramatic. 
---------- Figure 1 about here ---------- 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the incidence of favorable versus unfavorable distortion 
across all graphs for the overall sample.9 Based on a binomial probability test, the 
                                                
7 Mather et al. (2005) suggest that a 2.5 percent RGD approximates a 5 percent GDI distortion, the level 
Tufte (1983) recommends as a materiality threshold. 
8 For permission reasons, we changed all values and re-drew the graphs ourselves.  The trends and 
distortions depicted are essentially identical to those in the original. 
9 Six graphs are eliminated from the distortion analysis because the numerator value for the RGD 
calculation was zero. 
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evidence indicates a significantly (at p < 0.001) higher proportion of favorably distorted 
graphs.  However, a review of Panels B and C of Table 3 shows that the favorable bias 
overall is being driven by bias in the depiction of the materially distorted graphs only.  
Whereas just over 60 percent of the graphs with material distortion depict the distortion 
in a way that is favorable to the firm (overstating positive trends or understating negative 
ones), the non-materially distorted graphs are almost equally likely to be either favorable 
or unfavorable. This indicates that where graphs are materially distorted in their 
presentation, it is significantly more likely to present an image that suggests more 
favorable trends in performance than the data actually represents.  We interpret this as 
evidence of obfuscation.  
---------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
 In Table 4 we focus on the use of materially distorted graphs across clusters.  As 
highlighted in the table (Panel A), the proportion of graphs with material distortion 
increases significantly (at p < .001) as we move from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 (based on a 
Chi-square test for differences in proportion).  Whereas only 24.6 percent of the graphs 
included in Cluster 1 reports exhibit material distortion, 36.7 percent of the Cluster 2 
graphs and 40.8 percent of the Cluster 3 graphs are materially distorted.  This mirrors the 
incidence of earnings management across the clusters as reported by Leuz et al. (2003).  
Panel B shows the average number of materially distorted graphs per company with 
favorable bias, the average number with unfavorable bias, and the difference across the 
number of materially distorted graphs with favorable and unfavorable bias, on average, 
broken down by clusters.  Similar to the incidence of enhancement discussed above, 
companies from all three clusters have, on average, more materially distorted graphs 
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depicting favorable bias than unfavorable bias.  However, while the mean difference 
(favorable less unfavorable) is smaller for Cluster 1 companies than for either the Cluster 
2 or the Cluster 3 firms, this difference is statistically significant (at p < .05, one-tailed) 
only for the comparison of Clusters 1 and 2.  Thus, our expectation for differences in 
obfuscation in the use of graphs across companies from differing clusters is only partially 
supported. 
---------- Table 4 about here ---------- 
Discussion 
 The last decade has seen rapid growth in the use of stand-alone reports for 
reporting on corporate social and environmental performance, and as noted by Unerman 
et al. (2007), there is certainly much potential benefit to be gained from quality 
sustainability accounting and accountability.  Unfortunately, the evidence we present 
above suggests, at least in terms of graphical presentations, companies appear to be guilty 
of systematic manipulation designed to paint a more favorable picture of the firm.  This is 
evidenced by the use of both enhancement and obfuscation impression management 
strategies.  Companies across all three reporting regulatory structure clusters are far more 
likely to graph items showing favorable rather than unfavorable trends, and where 
material distortion in the graphs exists, considerably more often than not, the bias in 
design presents an image favorable to the firm.  These findings thus add support to those 
critics who lament that, rather than providing a meaningful accounting of corporate 
impacts across the sustainability domain, standalone sustainability reporting appears to be 
more about projecting an image of positive performance.   
 17 
We also find some evidence that differences in impression management in the use 
of the graphs appears to vary across regulatory reporting structures. Based on Leuz et 
al.’s (2003) classifications, we find companies in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 report a 
significantly higher degree of selectivity bias, and that the favorable bias in the use of 
materially distorted graphs is significantly higher for the Cluster 2 firms than for Cluster 
1 companies.  In general, these results suggest that companies in less restrictive reporting 
regulatory environments appear to be more likely to engage in impression management in 
their use of graphs.  
The systematic manipulation of graphical presentations is perhaps more troubling 
for disclosure in the social and environmental arenas than for similar distortion in 
financial reporting.  While financial disclosure is mandatory and subject to substantial 
regulatory rules, sustainability reporting remains voluntary and non-regulated.  This 
allows for potential abuse and biased reporting.  Thus, just as Beattie et al. (2008, 218) 
argue relative to the need for standards in the use of graphs in financial reporting, our 
findings suggest that “users would benefit from preparers’ adherence to a set of graphical 
guidelines.”  In addition to presenting guidance on what types of information might be 
provided in sustainability reports, therefore, advocate organizations such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative may need to provide guidance as well on “how” the information gets 
portrayed.    
 Like all studies, ours is not without limitations.  Our findings with respect to 
selectivity should not be interpreted as evidence of misrepresentation, but only as 
evidence of enhancement – the choice to highlight the positive nature of performance.  In 
order to test whether the enhancement practices are misleading, it would necessary to 
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compare the practice with actual performance.  Unfortunately, we are aware of no 
uniform measures of social, environmental, and financial performance for companies in 
the varied countries of our sample.  Examinations of the extent to which enhancement 
strategies are consistent with, or contradictory to underlying performance across any of 
the three areas, or across the institutional structures would be a valuable avenue for future 
research. 
 A further imitation relates to our focus on only one year’s reports and on only 
large firms from a limited number of countries.  Whether the findings we report hold 
across other time periods and other samples remains untested.  We also do not examine 
for longitudinal changes in the graphing of social, environmental, and financial items in 
the sustainability reports.  And while we show evidence of enhancement and obfuscation 
in graph usage for our sample companies, we don’t examine whether it actually 
influences user perceptions of performance across any of the triple bottom line areas.  
Finally, we limit our analysis to reports made available in a PDF format.  The availability 
of richer data formats such as eXtensible Markup Language (XML) for Internet-based 
reporting might provide other opportunities for companies to manipulate the graphical 
presentations of their sustainability (or other) performance.  We believe extension of our 
research across any of these issues could add interesting insights into the use of graphs as 
tools of impression management in the sustainability domain.   
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Table 1 – Analysis of Items Graphed Within Each Area by Cluster 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Total 
Area No. % No. % No. % No. % 
         
Social         
Employee-Related 86 45.74% 81 55.10% 89 35.46% 256 43.69% 
Safety and Health 64 34.04% 58 39.46% 62 24.70% 184 31.40% 
Community Involvement 28 14.89% 0 0.00% 22 8.76% 50 8.53% 
Supplier-Related 5 2.66% 2 1.36% 2 0.80% 9 1.54% 
Customer-Related 0 0.00% 4 2.72% 65 25.90% 69 11.77% 
Other 5 2.66% 2 1.36% 11 4.38% 18 3.07% 
Sub-Total 188  147  251  586  
         
Environmental         
Emissions-Related 91 38.89% 71 31.00% 69 22.77% 231 30.16% 
Energy Savings or Efficiency 33 14.10% 34 14.85% 47 15.51% 114 14.88% 
Recycling/Non-Hazardous Waste 37 15.81% 32 13.97% 60 19.80% 129 16.84% 
Hazardous Waste-Related 14 5.98% 8 3.49% 15 4.95% 37 4.83% 
Incidents/Spills/Remediation 
Activities 16 6.84% 2 0.87% 2 0.66% 20 2.61% 
Water-Related 24 10.26% 32 13.97% 51 16.83% 107 13.97% 
Product-Related 16 6.84% 22 9.61% 18 5.94% 56 7.31% 
Environmental Spending/Savings 1 0.43% 8 3.49% 6 1.98% 15 1.96% 
Other 2 0.85% 20 8.73% 35 11.55% 57 7.44% 
Sub-Total 234  229  303  766  
         
Financial         
Sales/Turnover-Related 8 20.51% 46 43.40% 49 35.77% 103 36.52% 
Earnings-Related 9 23.08% 16 15.09% 12 8.76% 37 13.12% 
Shareholder-Related 14 35.90% 8 7.55% 47 34.31% 69 24.47% 
Investments-Related 1 2.56% 22 20.75% 7 5.11% 30 10.64% 
Other 7 17.95% 14 13.21% 22 16.06% 43 15.25% 
Sub-Total 39  106  137  282  
         
Total 461  482  691  1634  
         
 
Cluster 1 includes companies from the United Kingdom and the United States.  Cluster 2 includes 
companies from France and Germany.  Cluster 3 includes companies from Italy and Spain. 
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Table 2 – Enhancement  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A – Overall sample 
         Number   Percentage  Binomial Z 
         of Graphs   of Graphs    (prob.)  
       
 Graphs depicting favorable trend      1,152        70.5% 
 
 Graphs depicting unfavorable or flat trend         482        29.5%     16.52 
                 (< .001) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B – Average Graphs per Company by Cluster 
 
    Graphs with   Graphs with 
      Favorable  Unfavor./Flat 
         Trend       Trend  Difference 
 
 Cluster 1        7.68        3.70      3.98 
 
 Cluster 2        9.15        2.85      6.30a 
 
 Cluster 3      12.18b        4.88c      7.30d 
 
a  Significantly different from Cluster 1 at p < .10, one-tailed. 
b  Significantly different from Cluster 1 at p < .10, one-tailed. 
c  Significantly different from Cluster 2 at p < .10, two-tailed. 
d  Significantly different from Cluster 1 at p < .05, one-tailed. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cluster 1 includes companies from the United Kingdom and the United States.  Cluster 2 includes companies from France and 
Germany.  Cluster 3 includes companies from Italy and Spain. 
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Table 3 – Obfuscation - Distortion Bias in Depiction of Graphs 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A – Overall Sample, all graphs 
         Number   Percentage  Binomial Z 
         of Graphs   of Graphs    (prob.)  
       
 Graphs with favorable distortion         881        54.1% 
 Graphs with unfavorable or no distortion         747        45.9%       3.30 
                 (< .001) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B – Bias in Depiction of Graphs, Materially Distorted Graphs Only 
         Number   Percentage  Binomial Z 
         of Graphs   of Graphs    (prob.)  
       
 Materially Distorted Graphs with favorable distortion      346        60.5% 
 Materially Distorted Graphs with unfavorable distortion      226        39.5%       4.98 
                 (< .001) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C – Bias in Depiction of Graphs, Non-Materially Distorted Graphs Only 
         Number   Percentage  Binomial Z 
         of Graphs   of Graphs    (prob.)  
       
 Non-Materially Distorted Graphs with favorable distortion       535       50.7% 
 Non-Materially Distorted Graphs with unfavor./no distortion     521       49.3%       0.40 
                   (.689) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  Material distortion is defined as a relative graph discrepancy score < -2.5 or > 2.5. 
 
Cluster 1 includes companies from the United Kingdom and the United States.  Cluster 2 includes companies from France and 
Germany.  Cluster 3 includes companies from Italy and Spain. 
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Table 4 – Obfuscation - Materially Distorted Graphs  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A – Incidence of Materially Distorted Graphs by Cluster 
 
       Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Χ2  sig. 
 Graphs with material distortiona  112 (24.6%)  174 (36.7%)  286 (40.8%)    
 Graphs with no material distortion  343 (75.4%)  299 (63.3%)  414 (59.2%)  32.72  0.000 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B - Average Graphs per Company by Cluster, Materially Distorted Graphs Only 
 
    Graphs with   Graphs with 
      Favorable  Unfavorable 
      Distortion    Distortion  Difference 
 
 Cluster 1        1.58        1.23      0.35 
 
 Cluster 2        2.93a        1.48      1.45a 
 
 Cluster 3        4.20b        2.95b,c      1.25 
 
a  Significantly different from Cluster 1 at p < .10, one-tailed. 
b  Significantly different from Cluster 1 at p < .05, one-tailed. 
c  Significantly different from Cluster 2 at p < .05, two-tailed. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Cluster 1 includes companies from the United Kingdom and the United States.  Cluster 2 includes companies from France and 
Germany.  Cluster 3 includes companies from Italy and Spain. 
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Figure 1. Graph Distortion 
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